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BASEBALL OR BESOBURO:
TIE IMPLICATIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW
ON BASEBALL IN AMERICA AND JAPAN
I. INTRODUCTION

This Note analyzes and compares the effect of antitrust laws on
professional baseball in America and Japan. In America, the judicial
antitrust exemption granted to baseball renders antitrust laws ineffectual.'
In Japan, however, no artificial barrier to the imposition of antitrust
penalties has been granted to the sport; rather, Japanese cultural tradition
and the active role played by the national government in the everyday
economy have worked to shield the game from the antitrust laws which,
as written, would otherwise seem to call for action and penalties to be
imposed upon the sport.2 White antitrust laws appear to have Uttile effect
today upon the sport in both America and Japan, they may soon have an
impact that could change the way baseball is played in the two nations,
both on and off the playing field.
This Note focuses first on the treatment afforded American Major
League Baseball under United States antitrust laws and how the laws are
applied and overlooked at times, with particular attention devoted to the
judicially created exemption from antitrust laws given to baseball in the
early twentieth century. The focus then shifts to Japan. In order to
provide an understanding of Japanese antitrust laws and their effects upon
baseball in Japan, this Note presents surveys of both subjects. It then
considers many of the recent developments from beyond the playing fields
that have had an impact on Japanese baseball, most importantly the new
player's union, and it analyzes how the antitrust laws of Japan may-and
should-have an impact on these developments. This analysis supports the
limited effects upon professional
presumption that antitrust laws have
3
Japan.
and
America
both
in
baseball

1. See discussion infra part ll.B.
2. See discussion infra part III.C.
3. See discussion infra part V.
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II. BASEBALL IN AMERICA-WHAT ANTITRUST LAWS?
A. The Economics of Sports-Self-Regulation and Antitrust
Most people, at least once in their lives, have competed in athletics
and have attained, or dreamed about, personal acclaim in sports. Sports
somehow bring out the competitive juices in the most mild-mannered of
children and adults. In some cases, it is the will or ability to succeed that
transforms professional athletes into larger-than-life figures. And for
many of the people who do not have the physical talent to compete in
athletics on the professional level, their fantasies are lived out through
their favorite players, to the delight of the small group of owners of Major
League Baseball franchises in America.
There are only twenty-eight major league franchises in a country of
over 250 million people. Two of the franchises recently finished playing
in their third seasons. 4 Because over 70 million people saw major league
games at the ballparks during the 1993 season, 5 and because there are so
few teams, it would seem that many more major league teams could be
fielded with the great number of players adept at our national pastime.
Though this may be the case, the owners of the twenty-eight major league
franchises have no desire to saturate the market of their monopoly with
more teams, thereby shrinking each team's piece of the lucrative economic
pie, without substantial financial incentive to do so.
Several antitrust questions result both from the owners' attempts to
protect their economic interests and from the federal and state
governments' attempts to regulate the sport. The owners, in the absence
or ineffectiveness of governmental interference, have had the advantage of
self-regulation to promote the best possible competition in an effort to
receive the largest financial rewards.6 Over the years, the Major League
owners have come to the realization that it would be self-defeating to allow
one or two teams to buy up all of the player talent year after year leaving

4. The Colorado Rockies and Florida Marlins entered the National League in 1993.
Two more franchises, the St. Petersburg Devil Rays, and the Arizona Diamondbacks, will

begin play in the Major Leagues in 1998. Chuck Johnson, Baseball History Links
Colorado and Florida, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1993, at 1F.

5. Randall Samborn, Baseball'sLawyer: Robert DuPuy Goes to Batfor the Owners in
Antitrust, Labor and Other Battles, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 1, 48.

6. Michael Jay Kaplan, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
ProfessionalSports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489, 493 (1992). See generally John P. Morris,
Keeping the Game Fairand Square-AntitrustLaws and ProfessionalSports in America,
59 AusTL. L.J. 476 (1985).

1996]

IMPLICATIONS OFANTITRUST LAW ON BASEBALL

423

the remainder of the sport's franchises to toil in perpetual mediocrity.
This self-regulation, while it may protect the interests of the owners,'
does little to protect the best interests of the players, the owners' most
important asset. Under this system, the individual athlete's "rights" are8
controlled, or owned, by a team from the start of his major league career;
he is "free" to bargain for the best possible deal only when a team no
longer holds his rights and he becomes a "free agent." 9 In effect, Major
League Baseball has created a system to distribute the resources and
7. The owners protect their sport, and thus their financial stability, by insuring, or at
least striving for, a level playing field. Stability and parity are the two most important
words to a professional owner. While it may sound contrary to the conventional wisdom,
owners do not want to win every game their teams play by substantial margins of victory.
If this were to occur, fans would not go to the stadiums to watch the games and would not
tune in on television, thus lowering the revenue and, ultimately, the value of the
franchises. By ensuring the outcome of games will remain in doubt, the owners have left
themselves in the position of knowing that fans will pay to watch their players perform,
and hopefully, win. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 494.
A key ingredient to the demand by fans for team sports is the excitement that is
created by the uncertain outcome of games. While there are a great number of fans and
spectators who go to or watch games for the sheer enjoyment of watching highly skilled
athletes compete, there are others who want to see their team win, especially if it is a
close victory against a team of equal, or greater, skill and ability. JAMES QUIRK &
RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT: THE BusINEss OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 240, 243

(1992). "If a league becomes too unbalanced, with too much playing talent concentrated
on one or two teams, fan interest [of] the weaker franchises dries up and ultimately fan
interest [of] even the strong franchises dries up as well." Id.
While it may seem that ensuring this competitive balance is a simple, peripheral, or
trivial issue, it is precisely this argument that has been used by owners of professional
team sports to justify the need for restrictions on the rights of players to freely sell their
services to the highest bidders on the labor market. Id. at 243.
Even more interesting are the playing-field results of the four major American team
sports leagues, the National Hockey League (NHL), National Football League (NFL),
National Basketball Association (NBA), and Major League Baseball (MLB), which have
all proven that parity is an elusive goal. None of the leagues has of yet created level
playing fields of competitively equal franchises. Id. at 268-70. In fact, overwhelming
evidence of extended competitive imbalances exists much to the dismay of the owners of
the perpetually losing teams. Id. at 270.
8. See discussion infra part II.C and notes 41-44.
9. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 493. While such self-regulation may be good for the
business of professional sports, it may not be good for the immediate interests of the
individual athlete, for some aspects of this self-regulation interfere with the right of the
athlete to strike his best bargain, the latter being possible only when he is free to
'distribute' himself where he pleases, according to the best offered price. An athlete's
interest in obtaining that best possible price is a substantial one, since the career of a
professional athlete is uncommonly short, compared with many other fields of endeavor,
and is greatly encumbered with risks of sickness, injury, and loss of prowess. Id.
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revenue in an orderly manner to protect the long-term interests of the
teams, the sport, and the owners themselves. This system, which attempts
to maintain a working balance, gives "rise to antitrust issues by restraining
the free purchase and sale of the services of the athletes in an interstate
market. "'0
While it is clear that a main purpose of American antitrust laws is to
promote free trade and competition," if these laws were strictly enforced
between the
upon professional sports, and specifically baseball, a conflict
2
vital interests of the players and the owners would result.'
If the laws are administered so as to afford protection to the players,
then the competition among the teams will lessen. On the other hand, if
the laws are administered so as to protect the teams and leagues, players
will necessarily be less free to compete with each other for positions on
the teams paying the highest salaries. If the laws are administered so as
to promote free competition for player resources among the leagues, then
the quality of competition within the leagues may fall. On the other hand,
if the laws are administered so as to protect the interests of a particular
team or particular league against newcomers, the protected team or league
would enjoy a monopoly of a sport. The reconciliation of these apparent
dilemmas has occupied a substantial portion of the time of those courts
which have attempted to define the relationship between professional sports
and the federal antitrust laws.' 3
B. Major League Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption
The result of the owners' employment of the above mentioned policies
over the years has been a great deal of animosity, as well as the creation
of an adversarial relationship between the owners and players."4 Much of
the enmity today stems from FederalBase Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
NationalLeague of ProfessionalBase Ball Clubs, 5 a controversial opinion
10. Id.

11. 15 U.S.C. § 1-11 (1993); 15 U.S.C. § 12-15 (1993).
12. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 494.
13. Id.
14. Mark Starr, We Was Robbed, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1994, at 46, 48-9.
15. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In this case, the Federal League of Professional Baseball
players sued the National League for buying up franchises from the former league and
inducing them to join the latter. The Federal League sought treble damages from the

American and National Leagues and their member clubs for conspiring to monopolize the
business of baseball, actions, it alleged, that were prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Id. at 207. See also KENNETH M. JENNINGS, BALLS AND STRIKES: THE MoNEY
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written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1922. In this decision, which
remains the prevailing one on the subject, Justice Holmes concluded that
the antitrust statutes did not apply to baseball because "[t]he business is
16
giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are purely state affairs."
GAME IN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL,

183-84 (1990); Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes:

A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 209, 212-13 (1983).
Under Section 15 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, all damage awards are to be tripled.
Section 15(a) provides in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained,and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The court may award under this section, pursuant to a motion by such person
promptly made, simple interest on actual damages for the period beginning on
the date of service of such person's pleading setting forth a claim under the
antitrust laws and ending on the date of judgment, or for any shorter period
therein, if the court finds that the award of such interest for such period is just
in the circumstances ....
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (emphasis added).
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provide, in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract
or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, in any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, in any other person, $350,000, or
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
16. 259 U.S. at 208. Justice Holmes continued:
But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free
persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not
enough to change the character of the business. [Tihe transport is a mere
incident, not the essential thing. That to which it is incident, the exhibition,
although made for money would not be called trade of commerce on the
commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by defendant, personal
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Thus, Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption was born.
Numerous challenges to Federal Base Ball have been mounted since
this controversial decision, both in the courts and Congress. Since the
mid-1950s, well over fifty different legislative proposals have been
introduced dealing with the antitrust exemption. 17 In fact, Congressional
opinion and hearings on this subject have been plentiful since 1992."8
Nevertheless, the most likely source for removing the exemption is
the body that initially created it, and the Supreme Court has had a plethora
of opportunities to reverse its controversial ruling.19 Thirty-one years after

effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce.
[T]he restrictions by contract that prevented the plaintiff from getting
players to break their bargains and the other conduct charged against the
defendants were not an interference with commerce among the states.
Id. at 208-09.
17. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 n. 17 and accompanying text (1972); John R.
Allison, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Status of the Reserve System, 25
BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 23 (1973).
18. Samborn, supra note 5, at 49. On September 30, 1993, the Senate Judiciary
Committee postponed a vote on bill S. 500, legislation which would have taken away
baseball's antitrust immunity, deciding instead to hold more hearings on the issue before
voting. The Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Right Subcommittee was chaired at the
time by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio).
In previous years, congressional committees have voted on legislation which would
have extended the antitrust exemption to other professional team sports to put them on an
equal footing with Major League Baseball. However, these past endeavors have all failed
attempts at enactment in the full Senate. Id.
In response to the players' strike of August 1994, many members of Congress have
fought to remove or alter the exemption. See, e.g., Steve Marantz, The Merchant of
Dennis, SPORTING NEws, July 4, 1994, at 14 (Senate committee kills a bill that would
have eliminated baseball's antitrust exemption specifically for collective bargaining);
Senate Judiciary Committee Votes for PartialRepeal of Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption,
SPORTS LAW., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 10 (House bill would amend Clayton Act; Senate
Judiciary Committee sends bill on baseball antitrust exemption to the Senate floor for a
vote on final approval); Murray Chass, Lawmakers Pursue 'Contract With Fans,' N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at B13 (five bills introduced in Congress ranging from a complete
repeal of the sport's antitrust exemption to compelling binding arbitration to end the
players' strike); Murray Chass, Bill to Curb Antitrust Exemption on Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1995, at 25 (new bill to be introduced in Congress which will remove antitrust
exemption); Murray Chass, Hatch Hopeful on Antitrust Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1995, at B1O; Claire Smith, No Sympathy forLabor orManagement on CapitolHill,N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at B20 (bipartisan anger in Congress towards both players and
owners for labor woes of the game).
19. The ruling in FederalBase Ball was controversial for a number of reasons. First,
Holmes certainly took a narrow view of what constituted interstate commerce when he
held that baseball was a sport, and thus not business or commerce; considering that the
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Federal Base Ball was decided, the Court had before it a case that would
have enabled it to reverse the antitrust exemption of Major League
Baseball and "rectify its earlier mistakes." 20 In Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 2 ' the Court was confronted with the first direct challenge to
baseball's reserve system. 2 The Court found, without reexamining the
underlying issues, that the decision in Federal Base Ball was still
determinative.
Congress has had the ruling [of Federal Base Ball] under
consideration but has not seen fit to bring such business under [the
antitrust] laws by legislation having prospective effect. The business has
thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was
not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present case asks us to
overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the
legislation applicable. We think that if there are evils in this field which
now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by
legislation .

. .

.

[T]he judgments [of the lower courts holding that

baseball was exempt from the antitrust laws] are affirmed on the authority
of FederalBase Ball ...

so far as the decision determines that Congress

had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of

bats, balls, gloves and uniforms used were all manufactured in different states and the first
radio broadcast of a baseball game was in 1921, the sport of baseball certainly could have
been classified as commerce among the states. Andrew Zimbalist, A Sporting Chancefor
ProfessionalPlayers; Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 23, 1992, at
25.
Furthermore, Justice Holmes was a former amateur baseball player, as was the
presiding Chief Justice at the time, former President of the United States William Howard
Taft. The history between both Justices and baseball was well known at the time, and it
may have played a part in their ruling. Id.
20. H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You're out: An Investigation of Professional
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REv. 369, 379 (1988).
21. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam). This case was the result of a player refusing
to report to his team's minor league franchise. After this refusal to report, George
Toolson of the New York Yankees was blacklisted, a move with the ultimate result of his
being unable to play for any other baseball organization. 101 F. Supp, 93, 93 (S.D. Cal.
1951), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 963 (1953). Thus, Toolson sued, alleging violations of
the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, and ultimately alleging that baseball was in fact
commerce. He argued that the travel of players and fans across state lines, taken together
with the radio and television broadcasting and the sale of interstate advertising rights,
constituted interstate commerce which Justice Holmes failed to find in his Federal Base
Ball decision.
22. For an explanation of baseball's reserve system, see infra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text.
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the federal antitrust laws. 23
The Court thus left the decision to remove baseball's antitrust
exemption to Congress. The reasoning utilized by the Court in this per
curiam decision was reached through an inference of legislative inaction
rather than via judicial thought or analysis; 24 because Congress had thirty
years during which it could have removed baseball's antitrust exemption
and yet chose to do nothing, the Court felt Congress must have intended
for the exemption to exist.2 5 This argument, coupled with stare decisis,2 6
seemed to sway the Court to uphold the exemption.2 7
However, two Justices in Toolson did not believe in upholding
Federal Base Ball or leaving the decision to remove the exemption to
Congress. Justice Burton, joined by Justice Reed, dissented:

23. 346 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added).
24. 1 will leave it to others to determine the wisdom of such logic and decision making.
This analysis is not the place for such a critique of the Supreme Court, and I am not
qualified to make such a judgment.
See also Philip L. Martin, The Labor Controversy in ProfessionalBaseball: The
Flood Case, 23 LAB. L.J. 567 (1972). "In terms of labor law andpolicy, the anomalous
baseball exemption constitutes a denial of individual rights being upheld by the exercise
of some very dubious legal reasoning." Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
25. Barton J. Mentitove, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis,
12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 737, 741 (1971).
While the language of Toolson relates back to the earlier FederalBase Ball
decision, it represented a new approach in upholding baseball's exemption.
Thus, the Toolson opinion has generally been interpreted to exclude the
business of baseball on the ground that Congress did not intend to bring
baseball within the antitrust laws, as distinct from the ground that baseball is
exempt because of the lack of interstate commerce.
Id.
26. The full term is defined as follows: "stare decisis et non quieta movere-stand by
the thing decided and do not disturb the calm." James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power
That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent:Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme
Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986). "The 'doctrine' of stare decisis interchangeably
describes either obedience to precedent, or obedience to precedent absent countervailing
considerations." Id. at 347 n. 15.
The doctrine is observed in order to ensure judicial stability and a public confidence
in the equal application of the law. However, it is not rigidly applied in all situations; the
Supreme Court has a history of overruling its own precedents when a majority of the
Court believes that the initial position was incorrect, or that it no longer applies. See,
e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
The Court has always chosen to follow precedent in dealing with the question of
baseball's antitrust exemption. See supra notes 17-19, 22, and 24 and accompanying text.
27. 346 U.S. at 357.
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Whatever may have been the situation when the Federal Base
Ball case was decided in 1922, I am not able to join today's
decision which, in effect, announces that organized baseball, in
1953, still is not engaged in interstate trade or commerce. In the
light of organized baseball's well-known and widely distributed
capital investments used in competitions between teams constantly
traveling between states, its receipts and expenditures of large
sums transmitted between states, its numerous purchases of
materials in interstate commerce, the attendance at its local
exhibitions of large audiences often traveling across state lines,
its radio and television activities which expand its audiences
beyond state lines, its sponsorship of interstate advertising, and
its highly organized 'farm system' of minor league baseball
clubs, coupled with restrictive contracts and understandings
between individuals and among clubs or leagues playing for
profit throughout the United States, and even in Canada, Mexico,
and Cuba, it is a contradiction in terms to say that the defendants
in the cases before us are not now engaged in interstate trade or
commerce as those terms are used in the Constitution of the
United States and the Sherman Act .... "
While Justice Burton's argument and reasoning may have been sound
in 1953 (and are even more persuasive today), baseball's exemption from
America's antitrust laws continues unchanged and without substantive
limit. Justice Burton was correct in arguing that baseball was, and still is,
involved in interstate commerce. Today, having expanded to Canada,
baseball has even outgrown the confines of American borders.29 Future
expansion to Europe, Asia or Mexico is not beyond the realm of
possibility. Even if major league games are never played beyond the soil
of North America, the games will continue to be broadcast live on
television all over the world until the current economic realities of sports
on television change. Having become a game involved in interstate, as
well as international commerce, the arguments for granting the antitrust
exemption offered by the majority in Federal Base Ball, and explained
away by Justice Burton in his dissent in Toolson, have become obsolete.
Many other cases dealing with sports and the antitrust laws made their
28. Id. at 357-58.
29. The Montreal Expos and Toronto Blue Jays were admitted to the Major Leagues

in the 1970s, and the game has prospered north of the American border. In fact, Toronto
won its second consecutive World Series in October of 1993.

Displays Guts, Respect, S.F. CHRoN., Oct. 25, 1993, at B1.

Bruce Jenkins, Selles
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way through American courts in the twenty years that followed Toolson.3 0
Both the Supreme Court and Federal courts refused to find that the laws
applied to any other sport, and they also failed to reverse FederalBase
Ball and lift the exemption. As in Toolson, the prevailing wisdom in these
decisions was that a change in the exemption was a decision for
Congress. 3
The most notable, as well as the most recent, of these
additional cases is Flood v. Kuhn,32 in which the Court held that even
though baseball's exemption was an "exception and an anomaly,"" it has
been endorsed by Congressional inaction.34
C. The Exemption Today -Its Implications & Its Effects

Recently, there have been renewed attempts to lift baseball's antitrust
exemption through the legislative process."

Prior to these attempts, the

main focus of the debate surrounding the antitrust exemption had been on
30. See generally United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing);
Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); Haywood v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (basketball); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (basketball); Washington
Professional Basketball Corp. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 147 F.Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (basketball); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966) (golf); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association,
359 F.Supp. 1260 (N.D.Ga. 1973) (golf); Phila. World Hockey Ass'n v. Phila. Hockey
Club, 351 F.Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (ice hockey); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S.
Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981); Drysdale v. Fla. Team Tennis, 410 F.Supp
843 (W.D.Pa. 1976) (tennis); U.S. Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d
781 (7th Cir. 1981) (trotting). See also United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955)
and H.B. Marienelli, Ltd. v. United Booking Offices, 227 F. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1914)
('legitimate' theatrical attractions).
31. "Toolson ... marked the first clear indication that the Court had determined that
any change in the nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to baseball would henceforth have
to be made by Congress and not by the judiciary." Berger, supra note 15, at 214. This
theme of legislative change was reexamined, clarified, and strengthened two years later
in the companion cases United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) and United States
v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
32. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
33. Id. at 282.
34. Id. at 283. Judicially created "anomalies" cannot be allowed to continue after they
have been discovered. It is the Supreme Court's duty to correct the anomaly that it
created in 1918 and to restore to baseball the regulatory protections to which all other
major team sports in America must adhere. The Court has recognized Congress'
misjudgment in failing to remove the exemption; it must now act affirmatively to correct
the mistake of decades past.
35. See discussion infra part l.B. and notes 18-19.
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the player reserve system and the player draft. 6 Since the middle of the
1980s, however, the conflicts plaguing Major League Baseball have grown
along with the reach of the judicially created antitrust anomaly. 31 "It has
become clear, as a result, that any professional sports antitrust exemption
has far more implications than just those which are labor-related. 3 The
new areas of controversy include the ability to unilaterally relocate existing
franchises, bans on cross league ownership of teams in different sports,
the ability of a league to reject the proposed transfer of financial control
of a franchise, and the transfer of concession franchises. 39
Although the reach of the exemption has broadened a great deal over
the years, the main issue that fostered its creation-the player reserve
system-is still controversial. 4 ° Under this system, implemented by the
league and adhered to by all member teams, a team holds the exclusive,
perpetual option to a potential player's services. 41 Each team agrees not
to employ a player who is under the reserve of, or whose rights are owned
by, another club.42 After a player signs a contract with a team, he is

36. JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 210. For an excellent analysis of the player reserve
systems in all of the major league team sports in America, see generally David L.
Steinberg, The National Hockey League Reserve System: A Restraint of Trade?, 56 J.
URB. L. 467, 468-82 (1979).
37. Id.
38. Id.at 211.
39. JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 210-11. For cases and articles on these various
subjects, see id. nn. 6-9. On the subject of the ability to unilaterally relocate existing
franchises, see Latour Rey Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the Continuing Vitality
of Major League Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption: A Review of Piazza v. Major League

Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420 (E.D.Pa. 1993), 21 FLA. ST. U. L.REv. 1271 (1994).
40. For a complete explanation and history of the reserve system in baseball, see Peter
N. Katz, Comment, A History of Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain:
Who's Leading the Charge?, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 371, 373-76 (1994),
For an additional explanation of the reserve system, see Article XX, the Reserve
System, of the Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League Baseball
Players Association, 1990-1993, published in Representing Professional Athletes and
Teams, 1993 PRACTISING L. INST. 64.
41. Id.at 375-76.
42. Allison, supra note 17, at 18. While this discussion only touches the surface of
the reserve system, it is sufficient for the analysis in this note. The baseball system is
more rigid than the systems employed in other professional team sports, even with the
advent of 'free agency' in 1975.
Other sports employ variations on this system. Both the National Football League
(NFL) and the National Basketball Association (NBA) have fewer problems with the
reserve system, at least from the standpoint that neither league has a minor league system.
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committed to play for that team until the team trades or sells his rights to
another club, or releases him outright from this obligation, which usually
only occurs after the individual is no longer considered an effective
player. 43 The team has the option to renew the contract within the
bargained-for limits regarding salary adjustment, and the player has two
options: (1) he can choose to play under the terms of the agreement, or (2)
he can hold out and refrain from playing (and thus not be paid a salary)
until the team consents to a contract more to the player's liking. This
system gives the player very little bargaining power while he is young.
However, the advent of free agency has improved the leverage of older
players; after six years of major league service, players whose contracts
have expired are free to negotiate the best deal possible with the employers
of their choice. This process works very well for the players' interests;
not only do players get to choose where and for whom they will play, but
in today's free-agent market, the player not receiving a multi-million
dollar contract is the exception to the rule."
While baseball's reserve system is less restrictive than it was twenty
years ago because of the free agency spawned player movement, many
antitrust questions regarding the system continue to be raised from two
sources: first, baseball's player draft of amateur talent from high schools
and colleges;45 and second, the effect of the antitrust exemption upon the

The labor and antitrust maladies of the NFL have been tumultuous and well documented
in the past few years. But the league and its players' association finally have a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), a new system of free agency which allows much

greater player movement between franchises, and after two strikes in eleven years, many
court battles, and the decertification of the players' union, at last the league has found
labor peace.

One question which remains even after the signing of the NFL's new CBA is the
status of the player entry draft. If it is challenged in the future by an entering player, the
question of whether it would be upheld by the court remains to be determined.
43. Katz, supra note 40, at 376.
44. Steven V. Roberts et al., A Bronx Cheer for Baseball, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 22, 1994, at 24, 25-6. The average salary of a baseball player has grown

incredibly since 1970: in 1970, the average was $28,000 a season; in 1975, $44,676; in
1990, $580,000; in 1992, $1.02 million; and in 1993, $1.2 million. Id.; Alexander H.
Butterman, Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption and an Owner-Imposed Salary Cap: Can They
Coexist?, ENT.& SPORTS LAW., Fall 1994, at 3, 3.

45. Major League Baseball's draft differs a great deal from that of other professional
team sports. Baseball gives a drafted player "bargaining rights at the time when he must
still establish himself as a professional product," a time when he has almost no leverage

with which to bargain. Morris, supra note 6, at 479. Young players are selected out of
high school and the selecting teams are given a period of six months during which they
can exclusively negotiate with the player. If no agreement is reached in that period, the
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rights of minor league players who are not members of the Major League
Baseball Players' Association (MLBPA). Even though the minor leaguers
are not members of the MLBPA, and thus are not part of the collective
bargaining agreement that governs major league players, their ability to
change from team to team and to negotiate deals with the teams of their
choice is hindered by the reserve system.4 6 While the outcome of possible

conflicts arising from these two sources is unknown, one thing is certain:
baseball's antitrust exemption will 47remain unless Congress takes
affirmative action to remove or limit it.
D. Antitrust Exemption Arguments-To Stay or Not to Stay
Various arguments regarding the effect of removing the antitrust
exemption have been offered, but predicting what actually would occur if
Congress removed the exemption is difficult.
For example, one
commentator attempted to defend the original decision in Federal Base
Ball.48 He believes that baseball needed the protection from outside
leagues, and as a move in the public interest to protect what was, and is,
an integral part of American society, the Court felt it was necessary to
extend to Major League Baseball a blanket protection from antitrust laws.
"If one accepts [this] view, however, one is forced to acknowledge that
the Supreme Court was engaged in overt policy-making for the benefit of
a single industry." 49
Others believe instead that retroactively reversing the Federal Base
Ball exemption at this time would have a terrible effect upon the game and
the owners.50 It has been argued that the owners and the clubs have

player is placed back into the pool of eligible draftees for the next amateur draft. The
original club cannot select the player again at the draft unless the player notifies the league

in writing before the draft that he has no objection to his original team's selecting him
again. Id.
46. Minor leaguers belong in a category separate from major league players because

they are in a unique situation. In a sense, they are men without a country.
47. JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 184.

48. Rogers, Judicial Reinterpretationof Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the
Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REv. 611, 620 (1977). In this article, the author is of the
opinion that Federal Base Ball was not improperly decided. "In view of organized
baseball's past hardships and its seeming emergence from them, it is understandable that
the Supreme Court in FederalBase Ball believed it necessary to maintain the status quo
and insulate the sport from further wars within leagues outside organized baseball."
49. JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 183.
50. Robert G. Berger addressed some of the concerns of the Supreme Court:
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invested tens of millions of dollars (and today hundreds of millions) on
player contracts, new franchises, and long-term stadium leases in reliance
on the existence of the antitrust exemption." In addition, it is possible,
though speculative, that to remove the exemption may substantially lower
the value of the franchises and unfairly and negatively impact the owners
of Major League franchises; in essence, chaos could result.5 2 In fact, the
Supreme Court has also used this argument in its decisions to uphold the
exemption. 3
However, this reliance is dubious. First, from the day Federal Base
Ball was decided, there has been much debate over the wisdom of the
Supreme Court's decision. First, there have been well over fifty pieces
of legislation introduced in Congress dealing with the exemption.5 4 As
wealthy, savvy business people, the owners of major league franchises
cannot maintain that they were unaware of potential governmental action
to reverse or alter the exemption.
Second, the other professional team sports in America have all grown
One of the main concerns of the Court on the several occasions when it refused
to overrule Federal Base Ball was its fear ...

that, since baseball had been

left to develop for some 30 years on the understanding that it was not subject
to the antitrust laws, it would be unfair to take away the exemption at such a
late date. But why could the Court not have made such a decision prospective
in nature, so as to subject only future actions of the sport to the Sherman Act?
In other situations the Court has indicated that new rulings could be rendered
which would be only prospective in effect. For example, in Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., a price fixing case, the Court ended by saying, "We reserve the
question whether, when all the facts are known, there may be any equities that
would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the rule
governing price fixing by the 'consignment' device which we announce today."
377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964). If the Court recognizes its ability to render
prospective decisions in this situation, why could it not have rendered a
prospective decision in overruling FederalBase Ball?
Allison, supra note 17, at 24-25.
51. Mentitove, supra note 25, at 743-44.
52. Id.
53. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). "Vast efforts had
gone into the development and organization of baseball since [the Federal Base Ball
decision] and enormous capital has been invested in reliance on its permanence." Id. at
450.
All four professional team sport leagues were granted an antitrust exemption by
Congress in the 1960s when they were allowed to act as a cartel to sell the rights to
broadcast their games on television and radio. This legislatively granted exemption would
not be affected if baseball's judicially created exemption was removed, and thus baseball's
most important protection would remain. Classen, supra note 20, at 389.
54. See discussion infra part II.B and note 19.
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and prospered without the benefit of a baseball-like exemption from
antitrust laws. 5 For example, the National Basketball Association has
grown and prospered significantly since 1980, adding six new teams.5 6
Additionally, the National Football League and National Hockey League
have both expanded recently. 57 Player salaries in all leagues have grown
to what were unthinkable sums only ten years ago.58 For example, Larry
Johnson of the NBA's Charlotte Hornets signed a contract extension prior
to the 1993-94 season that will pay him $84 million over the final eight
years of his contract. All three leagues have grown and prospered without
the benefit, or detriment, of a Major League Baseball-like antitrust
exemption. Baseball, in fact, may be better off without the exemption.
Third, large capital investment in purchasing a major league team
cannot be used as a reason to preclude legislative or judicial removal of
laws or regulation. Since the 1950s, Congress has shown a continued
interest in trying to remedy the problems and inequalities caused by
baseball's antitrust exemption.' 9 While most of Congress' efforts attempt
to end the unequal treatment all professional sports leagues receive under
antitrust laws, "it [also has] shown sensitivity to the need for an exemption
only as broad as is required to protect the integrity of the fundamental
structural elements and rules of each sport."'
The problem with resolving this conflict between the owner's and
player's interests rests in the prospective solution. 6' The relief must be
molded in such a way that the game, the owners, and the players all
remain protected. From a public policy standpoint, the main issue is the
games played on the field, not the games played in the courts and in
Congress. People want to see baseball games so they may return to those
childhood dreams of what could have been, and to escape from the real

55. Mentitove, supra note 25, at 744.
56. The Charlotte Hornets, Miami Heat, Orlando Magic and Minnesota Timberwolves
were added in the late 1980s. Two Canadian franchises, the Toronto Raptors and
Vancouver Grizzlies, began play in 1995.
57. The NFL added the Carolina Panthers and Jacksonville Jaguars in 1995. The NHL

has recently added five new teams: the San Jose Sharks, Tampa Bay Lightning, Ottawa
Senators, Florida Panthers, and Mighty Ducks of Anaheim.
58. See supra note 44. The average salary of an NBA players is $1.5 million a year,
while the average in the NFL is $737,000, and the NHL is $530,000. Roberts, supra

note 44, at 26.
59. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952), quoted in United
States v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236, 243 n. 7 (1955).

60.

JENNINGS,

supra note 15, at 221.

61. Mentitove, supra note 25, at 744.
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world for a few hours of enjoyment and recreation.
III. HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE
ANTIMONOPOLY / ANTITRUST LAW
A. Creationof Antimonopoly Law in Japan
Antitrust law is not indigenous to Japanese society. Rather, antitrust
is a Western concept brought by the American occupation forces to Japan
after its defeat in World War 1.62 The economic policies of Japan's new
parliamentary government, which were created by the American forces in
1947, were to be based on the principles of commercial independence,
namely, open and fair trade and competition.6 3 However, implementing
such a system proved to be a difficult task for the visiting American
leaders because anti-competitive policies and the concentration of wealth
and power were not viewed as problems in the pre-War Japanese
economy; rather, the government of Japan had a long history of
"promoting and managing key industries and then turning them over to
private companies at a low price . . . [which resulted in] an economy
dominated by a handful of giant business conglomerates ..... I In
effect, for decades prior to the War, a few companies controlled most of
the wealth and industry of the nation. To combat this old school policy
of anti-competitive government intervention into the private business sector
and to ease the transition to an economy of free-market principles, the
Supreme Commander Allied Powers65 drafted the Japanese Antimonopoly
and Fair Trade Law of 1947 ("Antimonopoly Act"). 6 6
The purpose of the act is made clear in its Section 1, which states:

62. Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The HistoricalBackground of Japan'sAntimonopoly
Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 115, 122 (1994).
63. Richard L. Thurston, Japan-The Antimonopoly Act and Japanese Fair Trade
Commission Enforcement, 27 INT'L LAW. 533, 534 (1993).
64. Jonathan D. Richards, Japan Fair Trade Commission Guidelines Concerning
DistributionSystems and Business Practices:An Illustration of Why Antitrust Law is a
Weak Solution to U.S. Trade Problems With Japan, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 921, 931 (1993).
65. Also referred to as General Headquarters, or GHQ. Akinori Uesugi, Survey of
Foreign Antitrust Laws: Japanese Antimonopoly Policy-Its Past and Future, 50
ANTITRUST L. J. 709 (1981).

66. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade
(Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947), reprinted in ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN
(Masanao Nakagawa ed., 1984) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act).
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by eliminating unreasonable restraint of production, sale, price,
technology and the like, and all other unjust restrictions of
business activities through combinations, agreements, and
otherwise, (the Act) aims to promote free and fair competition,
to stimulate creative initiative of entrepreneurs, to encourage
business activities of enterprises, to heighten the level of
employment and people's real income, and thereby to promote
the democratic and wholesome development of the national
economy as well as to assure the interest of consumers in
general. 67

However, enacting a restrictive Antimonopoly Act has not achieved
the goal of dissuading and preventing the Japanese government from
intervening in and attempting to promote the national economy.68
B. The Japanese Fair Trade Commission
The Antimonopoly Act itself is one of the most stringent in the world
on its face.6 9 It contains general ideas based primarily upon American
67. ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 306.
68. See discussion infra part III.C.
69. John 0. Haley, Antitrust Sanctionsand Remedies: A Comparative Study of German
and JapaneseLaw, 59 WASH. L. REv. 471 (1984).
The original Antimonopoly Act prohibited (a) agreements which
substantially restrain competition as 'unreasonable restraint of trade,' (b)
monopolization intended to control or eliminate other enterprises as 'private
monopolization,' (c) boycott, discriminatory treatment, exclusive dealing or
tying contracts and others which distort fair competition as 'unfair methods of
competition,' and (d) establishment of a holding company. In addition to such
fundamental regulations, it had several preventative or supplementary
provisions such as (e) prohibition of concerted activities which do not
substantially restrain competition but which affect it, (f)prohibition of the
establishment of private controlling organizations, (g) regulation of undue
substantial disparities in bargaining power (regulation of dominant position),
and (h) uniform restrictions on inter-corporate stockholding, interlocking
directories, mergers, and acquisition of business. In 1948 the Trade
Association Act was enacted as a supplementary act to the Antimonopoly Act.
This Act contained extremely severe provisions for restricting activities of trade
associations for the reason that trade associations are in a position to control
their members. Amendments were made several times until the present to have
the Act meet Japan's actual economic conditions.
ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 302.
It also "prohibits cartels as an undue restraint of trade when in a manner 'contrary
to the public interest' they substantially reduce competition in any particular field of trade
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antitrust concepts, 70 and the Act was rigorously enforced by the American
Supreme Commanders in Japan." After Japan was granted independence
in 1951, an independent five-person regulatory body, the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission (JFTC), which was modeled on the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission,72 became the sole enforcement agency for the Act. 7
1. Procedure of Enforcement
The creators of this independent administrative governmental agency
granted it powers that are both administrative and criminal in scope and
effect. 74 The powers of the JFTC are laid out in explicit enforcement
procedures which must be strictly followed to cite and punish a violator
The administrative procedures begin with the JFTC
of the Act.
conducting an investigation into possible violations of the Act. If a
violation is discovered, a complaint is issued against the company or
industry and a hearing is held. After the JFTC renders the decision, the
alleged violator may consent to the findings. If the alleged violator does
not consent and the violation continues, the Commission may obtain a
court injunction.
Instead of issuing a complaint, the JFTC may also issue a
recommendation to the violator on how it may correct the violations. If
the recommendation is accepted, no further action will taken by the
Commission. If it is not accepted, various remedies exist. In cases of
private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade, or unfair trade
practices, the JFTC has a variety of options at its disposal, ranging from
cease and desist orders to transfer of the business, and ultimately to any

....
In effect, cartels are banned per se." Kenji Sanekata, Antitrust in Japan:Recent
Trends and Their Socio-PoliticalBackground, 20 U. BRrr. COLLM. L. REv. 379, 380
(1986).
70. Sanekata, supra note 69; ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66,
at 301.
71. Uesugi, supra note 65, at 709. "Between 1947 and 1951, the GHQ supervised
enforcement of the act so strictly that it was virtually the enforcement agency. The act
has never been more vigorously enforced than during those years." Id.
72. Id.
73. Antimonopoly Act §§ 27-44, reprintedin ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN,
supra note 66, at 29-35.
74. ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 328. While attached
administratively to the office of the Prime Minister of Japan, the positions of the JFTC
members are virtually guaranteed for their five year terms, so they are virtually
independent from the rest of the government in carrying out their duties. Id.
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measures the Commission believes may result in the elimination of the
violations. 75
Anyone dissatisfied with the Commission's decision has the option to
appeal to the Tokyo High Court. If the JFTC's findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the Court is bound by such findings. As of 1984,
and in all but three of the
fory-three cases were appealed to the Court
76
affirmed.
were
findings
cases the JFTC's
In effect, the Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law grants the
JFTC virtually unlimited power to take any measures necessary to
eliminate acts in violation of the prohibitions contained in the Act;
however, it "does not give [the JFTC] the breadth of remedial power that
a corresponding grant of equity power would give an American
administrative agency."I'
In addition to administrative sanctions, the JFTC may also impose
criminal penalties upon violators of the act. Private monopolization and
unreasonable restraint of trade are the violations for which the greatest
penalties exist. For these violations, up to three years in prison and fines
up to five million yen are possible. The Antimonopoly Act also provides
for injured parties to claim monetary damages. 79 Any parties damaged by
the violations are entitled to indemnification, but no punitive or treble
damages are available. Damage claims are available only after the JFTC's
decision on the violations is final and conclusive. 0
2. History of Enforcement and Possible Sanctions
Enforcement of the Act, whether by the American Occupational
Forces prior to 1951, or thereafter by the JFTC, was, until recently, met
with much resistance and hostility."' From the point of its implementation,
75. Id. at 330. See also Richards, supra note 64, at 932-33. The JFTC is empowered

to initiate an investigation of any suspected violation of the Antimonopoly Act, either on
the request of a party or on its own authority. The JFTC then initiates an adjudicative
procedure, of which it can dispose by quashing a complaint, discontinuing the procedure,

rendering a consent decision if a respondent files a plan to eliminate any violation, or
rendering a formal decision. Id. at 933.
76. ANTiMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 330.
77. Antimonopoly Act §§ 7(1), 8-2(1), 17-2(1), 20, reprinted in AN'rIMONOPOLY
LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 8, 11, 21, and 23.
78. Haley, supra note 69, at 474.
79. § 25, reprinted in ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 28.
80.

ANTIMONOPOLY

LEGISLATION OF JAPAN,

81. Uesugi, supra note 65, at 709.

supra note 66, at 331.
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the Japanese Antimonopoly Act of 1947 was viewed by Japanese
businessmen as being "too rigid, overly restrictive, and in effect, unJapanese." 82 Additional hostility was vented towards the Act because of
its close relation with the American Occupation forces.83 It was
"considered to be one of the irresistible results of the defeat and measures
84
forced upon Japan. ,
Another problem of implementation existed, but it was a problem of
policy rather than politics. Two schools of thought existed: (1) there were
those who supported the implementation of the American competitive
economic philosophy through the Antimonopoly Act, and (2) those who
strongly supported the continuation of government intervention into
Japanese business activities, a policy which existed for decades prior to the
War. 5 While the former group may have won the battle with the
incorporation of the Act into law, in effect those in the latter group won
the war as the Act was rendered useless by of lack of enforcement during
the first two decades of its existence. 6
Even if the Act had been rigorously enforced after its inception, the
difference, in practice, between the administrative and criminal penalties
is of little significance because very few criminal actions are brought in
Japan. 7 Notwithstanding possible imprisonment, the principle statutory
sanctions for violating Japanese antitrust law are mild. 88 Most notable are
the maximum fines and prison terms for private monopolization and

82. Thurston, supra note 63, at 534.
83. Uesugi, supra note 65, at 710.
84. ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 301.
85. Uesugi, supra note 65 at 710. "A policy conflict was an obvious result. On the
one hand, the act gave Japan an antimonopoly policy based on American economic
philosophy. On the other hand, strong supports existed for government intervention into
business activities." Id.
86. Seita & Tamura, supra note 62, at 125; Haley, supra note 69, at 471.
87. Haley, supra note 69, at 475.
In the area of sanctions, the Japanese depart in significant respects from
...American patterns ....

[T]he Japanese have not had to create a system

of non criminal and therefore discretionary administrative offenses. Not having
a substitute for contempt, they forego the civil enforcement alternative of
American practice and are left to rely on criminal sanctions. If criminal
prosecution in any society ... is an unwieldy tool for antitrust enforcement,
in Japan it is even less useful. Japan is consequently left with an
extraordinarily weak system of lAntitrustj law enforcement.
Id. at 482.
88. Id. at 483; Antimonopoly Act §§ 89-91(2), reprinted in ANTIMONOPOLY
LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 55-57.
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unreasonable restraint of trade. One can be fined up to 5,000,000 yen, 9
which is approximately $50,000 American dollars at the current exchange
rates, and sentenced to a maximum of three years in prison.' While the
American prison term for similar violations is also three years, the
monetary fine is substantially greater; corporations can be fined up to
$10,000,000 for private monopolization and unreasonable restraint of trade
violations, and individuals can be fined a maximum of $350,000.91

Moreover, actually being sanctioned and charged with a violation is
extremely rare. In fact, since the inception of the Act in 1947, only six
criminal actions have been brought by the JFTC for antitrust violations,
relative inaction
and three of these actions were brought in 19 4 9 .9 This
3
resulted in a limited role for the JFTC through 1969.1

89. Antimonopoly Act § 89(1), reprintedin ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN,
supra note 66, at 55. Prior to the 1977 Amendments to the Act, the maximum limit on
fines for violations was one-tenth of their current level, amounts which constituted
outrageously low fines and provided a minimal deterrent to potential violators of the act.
Haley, supra note 69, at 483.
90. Antimonopoly Act § 3, reprintedin ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra
note 66, at 55.
91. Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade (Sherman Act), 15 U.S.C. §§
1-2 (1993).
92. Haley, supra note 69, at 484.
93. Uesugi, supra note 65, at 710.
A conflict arises in the enforcement process between the JFTC and government
agencies that work to promote co-operation among business enterprises. Id.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is the government's main
proponent of industrial policy, and from time to time it finds itself opposing another
branch of the Japanese government, the ]FTC, which, in effect, is working to enforce
legislation designed to prevent MITI from achieving much of what it would like to do.
Sanekata, supra note 69, at 380-81. In some cases, this co-operative effort in Japanese
industry results in the administrative government agency (usually MITI), the corporation
or the organization finding itself in a position in violation of the Antimonopoly Act, and
thus at the mercy of the JFTC. Id.
"Because administrative guidance is a leading device of industrial policy, the
prosecution of a cartel in the petroleum industry in 1974 led to a severe conflict between
the forces of antimonopoly enforcement and those of industrial policy." Id. at 381.
Further conflicts arise between the administrative industrial policy makers and the Act's
enforcers in the area of mergers and acquisitions, as they are prohibited where their
ultimate effect is to substantially lessen the degree of competition in a particular trade.
Id. That is, at least under the letter of the Act as it has been written. However, the
merger provision has had little effect over the years because of the difficulty in proving
lessened competition and the incomplete enforcement of the Act. Id.; see also Uesugi,
supra note 65, at 711.
'[A]dministrative guidance' . . . generally speaking refers to moral suasion
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More rigorous enforcement of the Act began did not begin until 1973.
During the oil crisis, the JFTC responded to the large public concern of
the well-publicized price fixing agreements between oil companies." This
movement, though, was not brought about solely by the JFTC for the
purpose of enforcing an Act which for so many years it had neglected to
follow. Rather, it was, "in one sense, a political response to discontent
among consumers caused by creeping inflation in a rapidly developing
economy. " 95
Notwithstanding the JFTC's motivation in improving the enforcement
of the Act, it has become clear in the past twenty years that the violations
of Japan's Antimonopoly Law will not be tolerated and will not go
unpunished. Recent amendments to the Act, most notably the 1977
expansion of the JFTC's power and authority, 9 6 have created an

employed by a competent ministry over businessmen under its jurisdiction.
The ministry [usually MITI often] tries to restrict production volume or
investment, or to influence prices to achieve its own policy objectives. This
kind of administrative guidance may have the same effect as a cartel; it
sanctions Antimonopoly Act violations.
Id.
Even after 1969, the policy and enforcement of the JFTC did not change
dramatically; there was no marked increase in the number of criminal actions filed by the
JFTC. Rather, "antitrust enforcement [has] developed within the limits of overall
economic policy, and the compromise with industrial policy was indispensable in the
context of Japanese society." Sanekata, supra note 69, at 381. For example, in 1969,
Japan's two largest steel manufacturers, the Yawata Steel Company and the Fuji Steel
Company, planned a merger which would create one of the world's largest steel
manufacturing and distributing corporations. Id. The Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) actively supported this merger in an attempt to strengthen the
international power of Japan's steel industry. Id. However, the proposed merger was
strongly opposed by most Japanese economists because they feared the creation of a strong
oligopy. Id. After three months of negotiations and modifying the merger agreement, the
JFTC allowed the merger to proceed. Id. at 382. This attitude of compromise between
administrative policy making and antimonopoly enforcement, both aimed at promoting the
well-being of an industry and the collective national economy, is a vital feature of the
Japanese government. See discussion infra part III.C.
94. Sanekata, supra note 69, at 381.
95. Id.
96. Thurston, supra note 63 at 535; see also Sanekata, supra note 69, at 397.
The revised Act provides for new provisions relating to:
(i) surcharge against an illegal cartel;
(ii) partition of giant enterprises in a monopolistic situation;
(iii) requirement of reports in case of parallel price increases;
(iv) restriction on total amount of stockholding by giant non financial companies and;
(v) strengthened restriction on stockholding rate by a financial institution.
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atmosphere for enforcement close to that envisioned by the American
drafters of the original Act in 1947. 9' Nevertheless, while enforcement
may be improving, the JFTC must still battle other branches of the
Japanese government that want to ensure economic growth even through
monopolies and government interaction, the very things theAct was created
to prevent.
C. Reasons for Governmental Interference into Business
to Promote the National Economy
The Japanese government influences industrial relations and
production "through a wide range of policies. "98 While much of the
influence may be unintentional,99 many economic, fiscal, labor, and
industrial policies and regulations have significant effects upon Japan's
industries and its national economy. '°° A long history of government
interaction in Japanese business was reinvigorated after the destruction of
the state and its economy during World War II. "[T]here was an urgent
necessity for the Government to establish systems guaranteeing a minimum
economic life for the people."101 As a result, the government began to
create jobs; to establish labor standards, employment security laws,
unemployment insurance, and a social security system; and to pass a
variety of other regulations and acts designed to protect the people and to
What has resulted is a Japanese
promote a high standard of living.' 0
government that "is involved in almost every social and economic issue [in

Other changes include: revision of [J]FTC hearing procedures and increase of
maximum criminal fines.
ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 305.
97. For example, in 1980, the JFTC disposed of sixty-two cases, of which twenty-four
were the result of price-fixing agreements. Uesugi, supra note 65, at 711. Additionally,
as a result of new powers granted by the 1977 amendments, the JFTC collected well over
2,000,000,000 yen (approximately $10,000,000 at the time) from 279 different businesses;
the largest surcharge on a single corporation was almost $800,000. Id. The total amount
collected approximated the JFTC's entire budget, making it the only self-financing
government agency in Japan in 1980. Id.
98. Kazuo Sugeno, Japan:The State's Guiding Role in Socioeconomic Development,
14 COMP. LAB. L.J. 302, 302 (1993).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 304.
102. Id. at 304-05.
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Japan]. "103
The government is involved in these issues for the most simple of
economic realities. Japan is a small island that possesses few natural
resources and even less arable land." As a result, Japan has traditionally
looked to other nations for many necessities through trade. 0 5 In fact,
Japan has never been economically self-sufficient. 06 Therefore, in order
to protect and to provide for its citizens, the Japanese government has had
to ensure the continued viability and prosperity of the nation's industries
and businesses.
Exempting particular businesses or industries from antimonopoly
enforcement helps to achieve this goal. A good example of this policy can
be seen in the situation where antimonopoly enforcement would hinder
export performance. Measures against monopolies may be withheld where
"such measures may reduce the scale of business of the said entrepreneur
to such an extent that the costs required for the supply of goods . . .
w[ould] rise sharply . . . and make it difficult for the entrepreneur to

maintain its international competitiveness .
"...
107 However, such
policies, and their loopholes, result in a significant role for the Japanese
government in the nation's economy.' °8 It follows, then, that such an
extensive role enables the government to allow selected violations of the
antimonopoly policy to continue, unhindered and unpunished, resulting in
a strong and wealthy national economy. It has also resulted in the game
of baseball going unpunished for violations of the Act that occur in the
adminstration of the nation's two professional leagues.
IV. BASEBALL IN JAPAN AND THE EFFECT OF ANTITRUST LAWS

A. History of Baseball in Japan
If baseball is America's pastime, it is Japan's passion and
obsession. " It is matched, perhaps, only by Sumo wrestling, the

103. Id. at 319.
104. Helen I. Bendix, Interaction of Business and Government in Japan:Lessons for
the United States?, 15 INT'L LAW. 571, 573 (1981).

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Antimonopoly Act § 8-4(l), reprintedin ANTIMONOPOLY

LEGISLATION OF JAPAN,

supra note 66, at 12. See also Bendix, supra note 104, at 577.
108. Bendix, supra note 104, at 578.
109. Barry Hillenbrand, Wa is Hell; The Name of the Game is Besuboru, TIME, Sept.
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country's national sport. " 0° Sumo, however, is a sport with local origins
and hundreds of years of history. '1 Baseball, on the other hand, was first
introduced in Japan in 1873 by Horace Wilson, an American professor at
Tokyo University." 2 It was the first team sport to reach the island shores
of Japan'3, and the game's concept was perfect for a society that had
always stressed the group ahead of the individual. "14
It took traveling American all-star teams featuring some of the
greatest players ever to implant the game in the minds of mainstream
Japanese." 5 In 1931, Lou Gehrig and Lefty Grove travelled across the
Pacific, and in 1934 Gehrig, Babe Ruth, and Jimmie Foxx were
featured." 6 It was not until the middle of the 1930s that the game of
baseball erupted onto the scene in Japan with the formation of an eightteam professional league." 7 Not even America's defeat of Japan by in
World War II could dampen the spirit of the population to the most
glorified of the American imports." 8
B. Japanese v. American Baseball-Similaritiesand Differences
Though baseball might be extremely popular in both America and
Japan, the two versions of the game are not the same." 9 Both of the sixteam Japanese professional leagues, the Central League and the Pacific
League, play 130 games in the regular season, with the winners at the end

25, 1989, at 87.
110. Phil Sudo, Take Me out to the Kyujyo (Baseballin Japan), SCHOLASTIC
Nov. 15, 1991, at 20.
111. ROBERT WHITiNG, You GOTTA HAVE WA 28 (1990).

UPDATE,

112. Ron Fimrite, Land of the Rising Fastball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 9, 1985,

at 62.
113. Sudo, supra note 118, at 20. In fact, the idea of competing in athletics for
enjoyment was an alien one to Japan. The Japanese language did not have an equivalent
word for the English "sports," so a word was created: supotsu. WHrnING, supra note
119, at 28.
114. Sudo, supra note 118, at 20.; see also WHITING, supra note 111, at 27-51.
115. WHITING, supra note 111, at 40-43.

116. Id. at 40-43; Fimrite, supra note 112, at 62.
117. WHrrING, supra note 111, at 45.
118. Id. at 48. A minor league American baseball team played 11 games in Japan in
late 1945 in an attempt to revive the game in the country. The attendance in the 11 games

topped 400,000 fans. Fimrite, supra note 112, at 62.
119. See WHITING, supra note 111, at 1-3, for a brief explanation of Japanese baseball.
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of the regular season playing in the Japan Series. 2 ° "[T]he style and,
most important, the mind-set of baseball in Japan differ dramatically from
those in America. Japan and the U.S.... are two countries separated by
a common sport."12 1 The quality of baseball played in Japan today does
not rival that of the American Major League game.' 22 The rules of the
game are the same except for a few notable differences:' 23 "[tihe ball
parks are smaller, the standard of play [is] lower, [and] the pace of games
,,
124 The stadiums in Japan, like the majority of the local
[is] slower .
players, are smaller than their American counterparts. In addition, the
aggressiveness typically found on American fields is lacking in Japan.
Instead, it is replaced with endless attempts at out-strategizing the
opponent by utilizing the sacrifice play and on-field strategy sessions that
often delay games. 25 As one author noted, "[T]he Japanese game was a
cautious one, not one of assertive strategy and tactics, but one of walks,
of sacrifice bunts in the first inning-a step by step approach that12 6seemed
to reflect the conservative bent of Japanese society as a whole."
There is a greater difference between the American and Japanese
games-the psychological makeup of the players from the two nations is
far greater than their respective physical abilities.' 27 The Japanese have
been importing players for their brand of besuboru 28 since the 1960s.
The foreign-born players, known as gaijin,129 are, and have been, mostly
Americans.13 0 It is a difficult transition for Americans to play baseball in
a foreign country that has a diametrically different culture, a language
barrier and, in most cases, a distinct work ethic that the Japanese often
declare is missing from the visiting American players.' 3 ' The differences

120. Id. at 1.
121. Hillenbrand, supra note 109, at 87.
122. Squeeze Play, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1988, at 24. "Japan's baseball is a lesser
game than America's." Id. See also WHrrING, supra note 111, at 313-18.
123. If the score of a game is tied after 12 innings or four hours (depending upon the
league), the game is declared a draw and both teams leave the field having saved face.
Squeeze Play, supra note 122, at 24. See also WHITING, supra note 111, at 1-3.
124. Squeeze Play, supra note 122, at 24.
125. Fimrite, supra note 112, at 58.
126. WHrriNG, supra note 111, at 15.

127. Hillenbrand, supra note 109, at 87.
128. "Besuboru" is the Japanese pronunciation of baseball. Id.
129. Fimrite, supra note 112, at 58.

130. Id.
131. For example, former major league player Randy Bass was one of the most
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in the two countries, both on the baseball diamond and off, have resulted
in problems for the foreign players; some members of the Japanese
baseball hierarchy have even gone so far as to suggest that they be phased
"The Americans, intense
out of Japanese baseball altogether. 132
individuals that they are, rebel [against the Japanese style of play and
living]. The Japanese conclude that the Americans are rude, lazy, and
worse, lacking in the sacrosanct wa, the sense of team spirit that obliges
the Japanese to subordinate everything else in life to the interest of the
134
team.' 13 3 The Japanese have a saying, practically a national slogan,
that is paramount in baseball, as well as the rest of society, which stresses
of the team: "The nail that sticks up gets hammered
the importance
35
down. "1
The more than 300 foreigners that have played in Japan since 1951136
have had an impact on the game of baseball far beyond the confines of the
foul poles. Within the past decade, the most important of American
imports has laid a new foundation for Japanese baseball that will have
profound effects upon the games heading into the next millennium-a
player's union and free agency along with possible antitrust implications
in the future.137 But, before beginning discussions of both the economic
development of the Japanese game and its new union, it is necessary to set
forth the economic history and background of Japanese baseball.

successful foreigners ever to play in Japan, "but his lack of wa nonetheless did him in."
Hillenbrand, supra note 109, at 87. Bass hit 54 home runs in 1985 and helped his team,
the Hanshin Tigers, win the Japan Series. "Then in May 1988, the idolized Bass left
Japan to be with his son, who was undergoing brain surgery in the U.S. The team
slumped and Bass' absence offended many Japanese; they could not forgive him. The

Tigers cut him and then quibbled over paying his son's medical bills." Id.
132. In 1984, the commissioner of Japanese baseball suggested a five year phase out
of the gaijin. As it turned out, the gaijin remain, and there is a new commissioner. Mike
Tharp, Japan's Solution to Competitiveness in Sports: American Imports; Peanuts!
Popcorn!Squid-kebabs! U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 4, 1988, at 60.

133. Hillenbrand, supra note 109, at 87. "Critics ... say that the gaijin players lack
honor and fighting spirit as defined by the Japanese." Yankees Go Home, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 27, 1985, at 15.
134. WHITING, supra note 111, at 70.
135. Tharp, supra note 132, at 60.
136. Id.
137. See infra part IV.C.2.
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C. The Economics of JapaneseBaseball
1. Ownership
Both Japanese professional baseball leagues are a haven for corporate
ownership and sponsorship. All twelve franchises in the Pacific and
Central leagues are owned by large Japanese companies-five are owned
by private railways or large department stores, four by food or beverage
firms, two by newspapers, and one is co-owned by a large automobile
manufacturer and the citizens of Hiroshima. 38 Additionally, most teams
do not take the names of the cities in which they play; rather, they become
the namesakes of the companies that own them.' 39
The owners do not own their teams to promote the game of baseball,
or perform a kind of civic duty, nor do they care if the team itself makes
a profit. Instead, they exploit their possessions to increase company
earnings. Professional baseball in Japan has attracted big names and big
money:
Major companies own teams for promotional purposes. The
estimated annual $16-million to $32-million cost of operating a
team can be more than paid back by having a company's name
spread across the daily headlines of Japan's many sports
newspapers . . . . [When the] Oriental Leasing Co. bought a
team, [it] renamed it the Orix Braves and simultaneously changed
its corporate name to Orix. Surveys showed that almost every
Japanese recognized the [new] company name within days of the
purchase. 140
While five of the six Pacific League teams lose money,' 4' they
provide an outrageously popular outlet in which to promote products. 42

138. Hiroko Katayama, Hamming It Up, FORBES, Apr. 6, 1987, at 150, 150. The
Hanshin Tigers, Hankyu Braves, Seibu Lions, Nankai Hawks and Kintetsu Buffalo are

owned by railway and department stores. The Nippon Ham Fighters, Lotte Orions, Taiyo
Whales and Yakult Swallows are owned by food or beverage firms. The Chunichi
Dragons and Yomiuri Giants are owned by newspapers. The Hiroshima Carp are coowned by Mazda and other Hiroshima businesses, as well as many citizens of the city of
Hiroshima. Id.
139. Fimrite, supra note 112, at 59.
140. Tom Koppel, Hitting Hard, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 2, 1989, at 54.
141. Id.; Katayama, supra note 138, at 150.
142. Id.
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In fact, in 1987, the president of the Seibu Lions said, "Japanese baseball
is not a profit-oriented business. A ball team plays a role that the main
company or group requires.""'
The parent company of the Lions, the Seibu group, which is known
for its railway and department stores and is the largest landowner in
Japan, 44 aims to create for itself a healthy and clean image. 45 After
every Seibu league pennant win and Japan Championship victory, the
corporation organizes a massive celebratory sale at the group's fifteen
hundred department stores throughout Japan.' 46 After winning the Japan
Series in 1987, the Seibu group held a three-day sale of its stores'
' While the consumers saved up to forty
clothing, furniture, and food. 47
percent on store merchandise, the Seibu group was said to have brought
in sales of over five billion yen, which, at the time, was over $35
million. 148

While the owner of the Lions has said that he wants his team to be a
self-sufficient, profitable organization, the other franchise owners look at
their teams and see tremendous, free public relations possibilities and the
reflected glory of winning. 14 9 The Nippon Ham Fighters, for example,
were purchased in 1973 by an Osaka-based meat processing firm called,
strangely enough, Nippon Ham. 50 The team was not purchased because
of its great on-field performance.' 5 ' In fact, it never had a winning
season in its short history, it drew few fans to home gaines, and it lost
upwards of $2 million a year. 51 2 Although the performance of the baseball
team has been less than exemplary over the first twenty years of its
ownership by Nippon Ham, during the same period, the corporation's
sales have grown by more than five times their rate in 1973. ' The
company now has sales over $3 billion and ranks as the largest meat
processor in Japan.' 54 After examining the numbers, it is no wonder that
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
WHrriNG, supra note 111, at 221.
Katayama, supra note 138, at 150.
WHrTING, supra note 111, at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Katayama, supra note 138, at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 16

only two teams changed ownership between 1973 and 1987. In fact,
selling a team is considered a loss of face and a disgrace to the seller. 5'
2. Players
While the economics behind the ownership of a Japanese team are
simple-the profitability of the parent company is paramount-the
economics of the game from the player's point of view is very different.
The Japanese players strongly resent the gaijin players, as much for their
perceived attitude problems as for their exorbitant salaries. 5 6 Foreign
players in Japan regularly make more than five times the salary of
The
Japanese players, who, in 1985, averaged about $50,000.'
chosen
resentment of the foreigners arises because the imports have either
not to, or have been physically unable to, withstand the rigorous training
the Japanese undergo before the season and during the games, 58 and they59
often fail to perform at a level that warrants such an excessive salary.
While the common perception is that the foreigners are greedy and
disloyal," 6 the Japanese baseball players do not want to be so perceived.
Rather, they work from eight to fifteen hours a day including the exacting
pregame warm-ups, in an effort to ensure the average Japanese worker
does not perceive baseball players as privileged.' 6 ' The nature of the
Japanese society, where the ballplayer works and plays, creates this
obsession in the individual as to how he is perceived by the general public.

155. Katayama, supra note 138, at 150.
156. Hillenbrand, supra note 109, at 87; Fimrite, supra note 112, at 58.
157. Id.
158. There is a great difference in the amount of practice put in by the Americans and

the Japanese baseball leagues. In America, spring training begins about five weeks before
the start of each season, and as each season progresses, teams cut back on workouts in
order to conserve the strength of the players. In Japan, teams hold voluntary training
sessions three months prior to the start of each season. All players attend. A full two
months before the start of each season, the players in Japan are practicing for a full seven
hours per day and spend even more time in team strategy sessions at night after practice.
Additionally, the Japanese players report to the stadium four to five hours before the start
of games during the season to go through on-field drills and more strategy sessions.
Hillenbrand, supra note 109, at 87.
159. Yankees Go Home, supra note 133, at 15.
160. Id.
161. Fimrite, supra note 112, at 58.
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[In the mid-1980s, Japan was still] a feudalistic society in
many respects. Company presidents were like feudal lords and
[Hisami] Matsuzono [the owner of the Yakult Swallows is]
certainly no exception.
There were strict rules of behavior in the Matsuzono
shogunate. The players were not allowed to drive foreign cars.
. . , they were forbidden to grow facial hair, there was to be no
and there were never to
special treatment for any individualism
1 62
be any contract squabbles.
Because of this perception, the Japanese players have, over the years,
accepted their comparatively paltry salaries and played the game. They
are "absurdly underpaid by our inflated standards," 1 63 they do not demand
that their contracts be renegotiated before they expire,' 64 "nor do they
have the gall to portray themselves as just plain union working stiffs.
Japanese players do not retire to the sidelines with abrased criticism or
complain of unfair labor practices if they are compelled to play a day
game after a night game." 165 These past beliefs and perceptions, however,
may soon change rapidly.
3. The New Players Union
The belief in the importance of the team over the individual, at least
in the area of player contracts, may have recently become a thing of the
past in Japanese baseball. When the players formed a union in 1985, it
was with the intention of bringing the collective salaries of all Japanese
players to a level closer to that of their American counterparts. 166 In
addition, the players also wanted to secure better playing conditions and
pension benefits, which at the time were seriously lacking. 67 Though the
union had a difficult time drumming up support after its inception (for
example, the entire Yakult Swallows team withdrew from the union shortly
after its creation when the team's owner showed displeasure with the

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

WHmNG, supra note 111, at 18.
Fimrite, supra note 112, at 57.
Id.
Id.
Lots of Diamonds but Few Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1986, at A24.
Id.
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actions of the players;168 it later rejoined the union,'69 it has since become
a powerful part of the game.
Before the advent of the union, player holdouts over contractual terms
were extremely rare.170 Players usually accepted whatever offer the team
made to them so they would not be perceived by their teammates, and the
general public, as putting their individual goals and desires ahead of those
of the team. 17 The players also had to endure the ever-present media,
which routinely criticized players as being greedy when they received a
raise after a mediocre season. 172 Even after the union's formation, there
was little solidarity among the players or the union leaders. In fact, shortly
after the union was formed, its chief declared on national television that
the players would not act like Americans and would not go out on
strike. "' A resulting poll of the Japanese players found that only twentyeight percent of the players said that they would be willing to walk out. 174
Obviously, the social pressures placed upon the players, from the media,
the fans, and the owners, weighed heavily upon their minds.
However, the weight of the pressure has lessened in the past few
years. Much of the decrease is attributable to the importation of American
players who are paid much greater salaries than the local players."7 But
it is also an issue of respect and fairness desired by the players. The
pension system was hardly sufficient when the union was formed in 1985.
At that time, players only qualified for benefits if they played for nine
years, more than three years longer than the average length of a player's
career. 76 Furthermore, if a player managed to play for fifteen years, he
would receive an average yearly payment of only $8,000, which was
of the average Japanese office worker's pension upon
roughly half
77
retirement.
In addition to the pension issue was also the possible reality of free
agency. Though Japan is a country where lifetime loyalty to one company

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

WHrriNG, supra note 111, at 18.
Lots of Diamonds but Few Riches, supra note 166, at A24.
WMTING, supra note 111, at 70.
Id.
See WHITING, supra note 111, at 71.
Id.
Id.
Fimrite, supra note 112, at 58.
Lots of Diamonds but Few Riches, supra note 166, at A24.
Id.
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is considered a great virtue, 7 the union representing the 680 members has
fought to remove the barriers restricting movement among teams.'7
Though it took almost eight years from the inception of the union to the
reality of free agency, the players, through collective bargaining, have
achieved this right that may change the face of the Japanese game. In
September 1993, the owners and the Japanese Professional Baseball
Players Association agreed to institute a system of free agency in
November of 1993.180 While severe limits upon free agency were written
will nonetheless increase, as will player
into the rules,' player salaries
82
movement between teams.
D. The Future of Japanese Baseball-AntitrustProblems
Now that the Japanese players have overcome their aversion to
forming a union, they can further alter their country's national sport. In
Japan, each professional team has only one minor league team, but, unlike
in America, the players are full-fledged members of the players union.8 3
As a result of their union membership, no potential challenge to the
Japanese equivalent of the American reserve clause exists. However, one
possible area for the union to attack is the player entry draft. If antitrust
challenges to the draft were undertaken, it is doubtful that it would survive
the scrutiny of the JFTC or the courts because it restricts trade. One only
has to look to the problems that American sports have had in justifying
their entry drafts." s4 As Japanese society continues to evolve and their
game of baseball continues to become more Americanized, the possibility

178. Id.
179. Players,ManagementAgree on FreeAgent Formula, Japan Economic Newswire,
Sept. 21, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Baseball PlayersDemand

Improvement in Free Agent System, Japan Economic Newswire, Jan. 27, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Players union seeks free agency after 800 games,
Japan Economic Newswire, Dec. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires file.
180. Players, ManagementAgree on FreeAgent Formula, Japan Economic Newswire,
Sept. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
181. For an explanation of the new Japanese free agency rules, see generally id.
182. Id.
183. Lots of Diamonds but Few Riches, supra note 166, at A24.

184. The Executive director of the NBA Player's Association, Charles Grantham,
called for an end to the league's annual draft of college players. Mitch Lawrence, Hurley
Appears Fora Coaching Cameo; Players Take Stand, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 13, 1994,
at 50. In its new CBA, the NFL and the NFL Player's Association compromised and
shorted the NFL draft by four rounds.
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that Japan's antitrust laws will play a part in the future of the game
becomes a distinct possibility. Whether the game will emerge unscathed
from the challenges of the future remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION

At the present time, the American and Japanese antitrust laws have
little effect upon the business or game of baseball in either nation. It
seems evident from the analysis in this Note however, that in the near
In America, there is growing
future this reality may change.
disenchantment among the public regarding how baseball is run, both on
and off the field. While there have been many attempts by Congress to
remove baseball's antitrust exemption since its inception, it seems as if
public sentiment may finally bring about the legislative action the Supreme
Court has advocated. If the exemption is lifted, the game of baseball
could change dramatically.
In Japan, the creation of the player's union in the mid-1980s was only
the beginning of the continued evolution of the business of baseball. The
recent implementation of a system of free agency will drastically alter the
salary structure of the players." 5 If the results of similar activities in
America are any indication, the players' demands regarding salary,
benefits, and freedom to choose for whom they will play will increase, and
it is quite possible that the Japanese courts will be deciding questions
regarding restraint of trade antitrust violations. It is true that in traditional
Japanese society, player loyalty to his employer would have prevented
such drastic actions. However, in a nation whose society and sports are
becoming more Westernized, suits alleging antitrust violations are not out
of the question. In fact, it is the position of this Note that they are to be
expected.
Andrew F. Braver

185. "The free agent system opened the way for several ball players to win higher
wage increases." Pro Ball Players Win Big Wage Hikes, Japan Economic Newswire,
Dec. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. In addition, after the
1994 baseball season in Japan, more than 30 players had signed contracts paying them
more than 100 million yen for the 1995 season, whereas only 4 players achieved that level
during the 1994 season. Id.

